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THE INTEGRITY OF DEATH: RESOLVING
DILEMMAS IN MEDICINE
Larry I. Palmer

The U.S. Supreme Court's declaration three years ago that
there was no constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide 1
has not ended the public debate over, or media attention to,
the so-called right to die. Proponents of the right to die have
simply shifted the debate to the political arena, as evident in
the recent ballot initiative in Maine seeking to establish by
legislation the right of a terminally ill patient to a physician's
help in dying.
The Court's decision this past term declaring unconstitutional a particular statute prohibiting so-called partial birth
abortion 2 will not end the political or moral debate over the
"right to life." The controversy about the legal parameters for
terminating pregnancy spills over into political rhetoric about
the appropriate uses of reproductive technologies and the
meaning of "family." The persistence of those acrimonious
debates over the role of medicine raises this question: Should
courts, the political process, or families control the intimate
matters of who should live and who should die?
Faith in medical progress has created the public dilemmas
about both the beginning and the end of life. The collective
search for meaning in our large and complex society fails to
acknowledge the influence of several basic social institutions
(family, religion, science, medicine, and law) in shaping intimate concepts of meaning. Too often people have turned
to one of those institutions, law, and particularly to the U.S.
Supreme Court, to provide guidance in their search for community. Science also appears to offer guidance. Belief in
scientific progress and its alliance with medicine has raised
the question of whether individuals-in collaboration with
health care professionals in their service-should create life
or control death.
A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DIE

As we consider whether there is a constitutional right to die,
we must remember that a decade ago-before the debate
began over a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide-the justices had already answered no in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health. 3 The fact that even
so-called conservative justices within the institutional constraints of the U.S. Supreme Court used different methods of
reasoning to arrive at their respective nos indicates that judges
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have different conceptions of the Court's role in institutional
life. Those different conceptions are evident from the different questions each raises about the relationship oflegal institutions to the institution of medicine. Underlying all the
justices' questions is a fundamental assumption that legislatures, as opposed to courts, are the primary forum for determining the degree of legal control there should be over
modem medicine.
Legislatures provide a process that adjudication cannot
provide. The question about dying that legislatures at the state
level have consistently addressed over the past twentyfive years is whether a patient is terminaL Through courtdeveloped doctrine and legislative ratification, nearly every
state has in place the legal means of removing or withholding medical treatment from terminal patients with few, if any,
possible legal ramifications for physicians. During the past
decade, however, Jack Kevorkian, with the assistance of the
national media, has transformed the public question about
the terminally ill by assisting in the death of many patients
most of us would categorize as chronically ill. There is in fact
no legal or legislative definition of "chronically ill," but
Kevorkian's rhetoric has forced us to consider if legal
definitions of "terminally ill" will suffice in a world in which
most of us will die of chronic, as opposed to acute, illnesses.
In contrast to medicine, law in general is slow in adapting
to social, economic, and ethical changes. The decade-long
battle by Michigan prosecutors to convict Kevorkian for his
assistance in more than 130 deaths should remind us what
"due process" of law means. Law is a rather clumsy process,
constrained in our system by its reliance on the past, what
lawyers call precedents, and some traditions, such as the

November 2000

1

requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, before lay
jurors are authorized to convict anyone of a crime.
People like Kevorkian, with resources to acquire lawyers
and gamer media attention, can take advantage of technicalities in the pure novelty of the issues they present.
Kevorkian's ability to escape conviction until recently must
be seen against the backdrop that application of criminal laws
to modern physicians is already fraught with uncertainty. In
dealing with the withdrawal or withholding of treatment, the
legislature in Michigan and elsewhere has been vigilant in
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protecting physicians from legal liability. In others words,
physicians run less risk of criminal conviction than most defendants charged with homicide. 4
The institution of medicine has begun to play an important part in our construct of death. It should come as no surprise that lay jurors had difficulty convicting Kevorkian until
prosecutors had new tools-new laws about assisted suicide,
technological evidence such as the videotape of Kevorkian
injecting a patient, more control over admissible evidence,
and perhaps a shift in public attitudes after the defeat of the
initiative to legalize physician-assisted suicide. In any event,
convicting a physician, even a defrocked one, for his alleged
acts of mercy, acts that symbolize the idea of medical and social
progress, is a difficult task for a jury consisting of past and future
patients.
WHO WILL DECIDE?

As we move into legislative debates about assisted suicide and
adequate pain medication, we are reminded that law is itself
a complex institution of courts, administrative bodies, commissions, and legislatures. We are now in a legislative era in
which acrimony over "rights" in the abortion debate must be
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replaced by a public discourse that respects our rich diversity.
Although the religious conviction that life begins at conception quite properly did not prevail in the constitutional
debate over abortion, that does not mean that the spiritualethical and religious position on assisted suicide and euthanasia-that suffering is a necessary part of human life-must
be silenced in the legislative and regulatory debates on assisting death. Religion as an institution plays too important a
role in American life to be ignored in the public debate over
suffering that proponents of physician-assisted suicide have
forced on us.
Proponents offer secular understandings of suffering that
must compete with various religious understandings of suffering in the legislative debates. Although in polls Americans express favorable views towards legalizing some form of
physician-assisted death, when they vote, they often vote
against such proposals, as the 1998 Michigan vote overwhelmingly indicates. While some legal scholars suggest that church
groups' assistance in defeating proposals to legalize physicianassisted suicide is somehow illegitimate or leads to voter irrationality,5 the views of those scholars are grounded in a vision
of law as solely court-developed constitutional doctrine.
Within institutional analysis it is impossible to remove the
influence of religious beliefs from voter behavior, because
those beliefs are intimately tied to individual conceptions of
family and community.
When the proponents of physician-assisted suicide took
their secular crusade to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court
gave an institutional response: If physicians are to have legal
immunity for death-assisting activities, legislatures rather than
courts must grant that immunity.
While the justices were divided on how they reasoned to
that result, they posed these more-general questions for medicine and those who seek to regulate health care professionals: Should we view physicians as relievers and managers of
pain, as determined scientifically rather than existentially?
Should we in our public debates reject the metaphor of"physicians as relievers of suffering," just as we rejected a previous
generation's metaphor of physicians as the preservers of life
and the fighters against death? A reliever-of-pain metaphor,
as opposed to a reliever-of-suffering metaphor, encourages us
to use all our institutional resources-science, medicine, law,
family, and even religion-to assist those with the pain of
chronic conditions or terminal illnesses to live and die welL

The U.S. Supreme Court's opinions on assisted suicide
affirmed the right of any state to legalize assisted suicide and
thus retroactively affirmed the constitutionality of the Oregon
Death with Dignity Act. The problem remains whether Oregon provides the appropriate direction for other states that
might consider the question. Oregon should not be the model,
once we understand that legislatures are the appropriate fo-
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rum, and the rules of engagement for legislative change are
very different from the rights-oriented discussions of the past.
Legislative change is a complex process, because medicine
is already highly regulated by a combination of statutes, court
decisions, and administrative regulations. Proponents of the
Oregon approach will use a combination of personal tales of
horrible deaths and data about the Oregon experience6 to
argue for legislative change. My own prediction is that we will
continue to agonize over the role of physicians in our dying
but that few states will follow the Oregon example. There are
many forces within the institution of medicine for limiting
the widespread use of lethal doses of drugs even in Oregon,
not the least of which is the question of whether pharmacists
are willing or ethically bound to fill the prescriptions. 7
Furthermore, once we recognize that legislatures are the
appropriate forum for exercising social control over medicine,
it is apparent that the rights view of the relationship of medicine to law is simplistic. For instance, to change the "law" in
Michigan to allow physician-assisted death required voters
to read and understand a 12,000-word document proposing
many modifications of statutes rather than a simple yes or no
vote on a slogan about rights. Michigan citizens voted against
the changes, since their ramifications in relation to important concepts of family and the integrity of death, as well as
life, were unclear.

LIFE AND DEATH

That, finally, is the crux of the matter. The constitutional
debate over physician-assisted suicide has illustrated that we
cannot deal with death without talking about life. That debate has also demonstrated the limitations of both law and
medicine in providing us with the choices that lead to meaningful lives and peaceful deaths. What we must seek from both
institutions is a matrix that supports choice as well as responsibility for individuals.
l11ere are vast personal, social, and ethical issues involved
in how we live and die. In a democratic and pluralistic society, many questions will have to involve political processes,
with all their limitations. Medicine and law are social systems
within a dynamic, fluid community. Neither medicine nor law
can provide meaningful lives or graceful deaths, but they can
provide choices that affirm for individuals who they are. It is
within that matrix of choice that both beginnings and endings have value for each of us, as well as for our society.
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